Normalization of Process Safety Metrics by Wang, Mengtian
  
NORMALIZATION OF PROCESS SAFETY METRICS 
 
 
 
A Thesis 
by 
MENGTIAN WANG 
 
 
Submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies of 
Texas A&M University 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
 
MASTER OF SCIENCE 
 
 
 
 
August 2012 
 
 
 
Major Subject: Safety Engineering  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Normalization of Process Safety Metrics 
Copyright 2012 Mengtian Wang 
  
  
NORMALIZATION OF PROCESS SAFETY METRICS 
 
 
 
A Thesis 
by 
MENGTIAN WANG 
 
 
Submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies of 
Texas A&M University 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
 
MASTER OF SCIENCE 
 
 
Approved by: 
Chair of Committee,  M. Sam Mannan 
Committee Members, Mahmoud El-Halwagi 
 Martin A.Wortman 
Head of Department, Charles Glover 
 
August 2012 
 
Major Subject: Safety Engineering 
 iii 
ABSTRACT 
 
Normalization of Process Safety Metrics. (August 2012) 
Mengtian Wang, B.Eng, Zhejiang University of Technology 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr.M. Sam Mannan 
 
This study is aimed at exploring new process safety metrics for measuring the 
process safety performance in processing industries. Following a series of catastrophic 
incidents such as the Bhopal chemical tragedy (1984) and Phillips 66 explosion (1989), 
process safety became a more important subject than ever. These incidents triggered the 
development and promulgation of the Process Safety Management (PSM) standard in 
1992. While PSM enables management to optimize their process safety programs and 
organizational risks, there is an emerging need to evaluate the process safety 
implementation across an organization through measurements. Thus, the process safety 
metric is applied as a powerful tool that measures safety activities, status, and 
performance within PSM. 
In this study, process safety lagging metrics were introduced to describe the 
contribution of process related parameters in determining the safety performance of an 
organization. Lagging metrics take process safety incidents as the numerator and divide 
it by different process-related denominators. Currently a process lagging metric (uses 
work hours as denominator) introduced by the Center for Chemical Process Safety 
(CCPS) has been used to evaluate the safety performance in processing industries. 
However, this lagging metric doesn’t include enough process safety information. 
 iv 
Therefore, modified denominators are proposed in this study and compared with the 
existing time-based denominator to validate the effectiveness and applicability of the 
new metrics. Each proposed metric was validated using available industry data. 
Statistical unitization method has converted incident rates of different ranges for the 
convenience of comparison. Trend line analysis was the key indication for determining 
the appropriateness of new metrics. Results showed that some proposed process-related 
metrics have the potential as alternatives, along with the time-based metric, to evaluate 
process safety performance within organizations.  
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NOMENCLATURE 
 
ACC American Chemistry Council 
API American Petroleum Institute 
CCPS Center for Chemical Process Safety 
EHS Environmental Health and Safety 
EIA Energy Information Administration 
HAZID Hazard Identification Study 
HAZOP Hazard and Operability Study 
HSE Health and Safety Executive 
IADC International Association of Drilling Contractor 
LOPC Lost of Primary Containment 
LTIR Lost Time Injury Rate 
OSHA Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
PHA Process Hazard Analysis 
PSM Process Safety Management 
SIL Safety Integrity Level 
TRIR Total Recordable Injury Rate 
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1. INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Due to the growth of process complexity in equipment and plant design, many 
chemical incidents have been triggered by human errors, technological and process 
failures rather than natural disasters. In the meantime, the concept of “safety” associated 
with worker safety has been replaced by a new interpretation: “loss prevention.” The 
loss prevention concept emphasizes identifying hazardous chemicals, inappropriate 
behaviors and procedures leading to process barrier deficiencies, incidents, and mishaps 
(Crowl & Louvar, 2011). 
Over the last few decades, personal safety has been identified as a key indication 
of safety performance in organizations. The primary processing industry practice for 
measuring personal safety performance is by using the Lost Time Injury Rate (LTIR) 
introduced by Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) or other similar 
occupational safety metrics such as the Total Recordable Injury Rate (TRIR). However, 
these metrics do not reflect the safety performance of plant operations and most 
importantly, do not provide an early warning for preventing any near-misses and/or 
chemical incidents. Because of some catastrophic incidents such as Bhopal chemical 
tragedy (1984), Phillips 66 explosion (1989), and Texas City disaster (2005), process 
industries have extended their concerns from personal safety to process safety.  
 
 
____________ 
This thesis follows the style of Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries. 
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1.1 The Limitation of Personal Safety Metrics 
Worker-related fatalities, injuries, and illnesses have long time used as the 
statistical numbers for tracking personal safety incidents. The advantage of chasing 
lower occupational injury and illness rates did spur companies to achieve superior safety 
performance. However, this statistics provided only concerns about personal safety and 
thus, little can be inferred about the success of process incident prevention. Kletz (Kletz, 
1993) mentioned that process industries placing too much emphasis on personal safety 
statistics would lead to over confidence about the safety performance, at the meantime, 
there are more can be controlled besides personal safety. Though personal safety is often 
labeled as process safety, the difference between the two is quite apparent. Personal 
safety is concerned with various hazards that could endanger plant workers. It is used as 
a valuable indicator to understand how safe the workplace is. The risks associated with 
personal safety are identifiable and manageable, because workers can avoid risk through 
training or by using appropriate personal protection equipment. On the contrary, process 
safety refers to the quality, status, actions or preventative controls to mitigate process 
hazards on personnel, property and environment. Groeneweg (Groeneweg, 2006) also 
checked the correlations between all personal rates (fatal accident rate, lost time injury 
frequency, total recordable injury frequency and near-misses), and the results showed 
that injury rates can hardly help preventing the “primary process” incident.  
Although the occupational injury and illness estimation rates have been widely 
used to track the execution of PSM program, this approach was found to be ineffective 
(Morrison, Fecke & Martens, 2011). This is because most process safety accidents are 
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not easily comprehended and often require some assistance from Environmental Health 
and Safety (EHS) experts. Therefore, the personal safety approach is not suitable for 
measuring process safety performance.  
 
1.2 The Implementation of Process Safety Metrics 
The occurrence of Bhopal chemical tragedy and Phillips 66 explosion spurred 
people to initiate a PSM. While the most recent catastrophic incident at BP Texas City 
warned industries about the importance of maintaining an effective PSM program and 
the serious impacts of PSM failures. The process industries should improve the 
deficiency or weakness of their PSM programs, by periodic audit and site inspection. 
The BP Texas City incident also represents the typical management style that puts more 
emphasis on personal safety and environmental performance rather than process safety, 
which depicts the deficiencies existing in PSM systems, management, leadership and 
oversight (Allars, 2007).  
In the investigation report of BP’s five U.S. refineries conducted by an 
independent safety review panel (Baker, 2007), the report points out that corporate 
leadership is accountable for operational safety and safety culture stands at the top of the 
safety pyramid. Moreover, specific recommendations from the Baker report have given 
strong indications that it is time to revisit and transform process safety programs across 
the process industry. In addition, the US Chemical Safety Board (CSB, 2005) highlights 
the urgent need for better metrics to identify process safety issues.  
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Process industries (refinery, oil and gas, petrochemical, chemical, drilling) often 
deal with one or more hazardous materials, such as flammable and combustible liquids, 
and reactive chemicals. How can we ensure these processes or operations can be carried 
out in a safe controlled manner? The implementation of process safety management is a 
strategy to maintain process operating conditions, to match demands of production and 
to keep personnel and equipment safe. Technological advances combined with increased 
process complexities continue to challenge process engineers in identifying hidden 
threats. Different hazard analysis methods such as process hazard analysis (PHA), 
hazard identification (HAZID) study, hazard and operability (HAZOP) study, and safety 
integrity level (SIL) classification and verification have been used to assure the 
protection of all safety critical elements. Particularly, the process safety metrics are 
expected to be indicators of the failures of PSM systems. The intent of metrics 
development is to provide the assessment of outstanding or deficiencies of the intended 
program. Using process safety metrics as the assessment elements can identify where the 
improvements are needed and where the impacts are occurring.  
 
1.2.1 Lagging and leading indicators 
Process safety metrics can be interpreted as tracking lagging and leading 
performance indicators in certain forms (absolute or normalized, and operational or 
strategic), these metrics can help people understand the system weaknesses and 
deficiencies. Lagging indicators are outcome-oriented indicators, they represent past 
events that have greater or less consequences (HSE, 2006). The statistical data of 
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incidents and reported near-misses is treated as lagging indicators which are analogous 
to personal safety statistics. Examples of lagging indicators are employee or contractor 
days away from work injury or fatality caused by process operations, fire or explosion 
cause property damage, and unplanned toxic release over threshold quantities.  
On the other hand, leading indicators are more forward-looking. They can be 
treated as a systematic probe. This probe can provide process and practice change 
information; it also helps personnel identify safety performance in order to avoid 
mishaps (EPRI, 2001). Typical fields of leading indicators can be generated from 
mechanical integrity, action items follow-up, management of change, process safety 
training, fatigue and process safety culture (CCPS, 2007).  These lagging and leading 
indicators are expected to make a significant contribution in lowering near-misses and 
chemical incidents. 
It is extremely rare to encounter a process incident caused by a single 
failure .Usually it happens due to the failures of multiple protective barriers at the same 
time. British psychologist, James T. Reason (Reason, 1990), illustrated the chronology 
of an incident in his “Swiss chess model” as shown in Fig. 1. Each slice of the Swiss 
cheese represents a protective barrier (engineering controls, administration practices or 
passive alarm), while the holes in each cheese layer represent the existing gaps or 
weaknesses within each barrier. When the holes from each layer align coincidentally as 
depicted in a straight-line pattern in Fig. 1, it will result in an accident. 
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Fig. 1. “Swiss Cheese Model” (CCPS, 2011) 
 
From the process metrics viewpoint, lagging indicators describe incidents that 
meet the threshold of severity, such as loss of containment. Meanwhile, leading 
indicators identify the failures of protective barriers prior to the incident. Being the 
integral part of the PSM system, process safety metrics play the role of measuring 
consequence severity and detecting low-impact events such as near misses and systemic 
flaws.  
 
1.2.2 The development of process safety indicators 
To improve the limitations of existing process safety metrics, many agencies or 
organizations have proposed improved process safety metrics, involving leading and 
lagging indicators as the assessment elements. The contribution of leading and lagging 
metrics would be pertinent to improve safety performance either from past incidents or 
through the current implementation of PSM programs.  
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Much effort to develop the process safety metrics has originated from the U.S. 
and Europe. The United Kingdom Health and Safety Executive developed a Step-By-
Step Guide to Developing Process Safety Performance Indicators (HSE, 2006) to help 
management track performance indicators within an organization to assure that major 
hazard risks are controlled or eliminated. In this guide, lagging indicators are the 
indications that decide whether desired safety target has failed or has not been 
accomplished. Meanwhile, leading indicators incorporate substantial information which 
reflects the health of safety systems and barriers. The Center for Chemical Process 
Safety (CCPS)’s Guidelines for Risk Based Process Safety (CCPS, 2007) suggests 21 
process safety metrics, which cover almost every aspect of safety systems. Subsequently, 
CCPS published the book entitled ‘Guidelines for Process Safety Metrics’ (CCPS, 2009), 
which gives guidelines for organizations to implement process safety metrics into 
existing safety programs and to identify three major lagging metrics: process safety 
incident count, process safety incident rate, and process safety severity rate. Leading 
metrics are considered as the tool to indicate key elements of production process, 
operating discipline or control system. As an early signal of process deviations that 
against protective barriers, leading metrics provide corrective actions to avoid accidents. 
In addition, the American Petroleum Institute released the Recommended Practice 754 
(API, 2010), which provides guidance on process safety performance indicators for 
refining and petrochemical industries. Process safety incidents with consequences such 
as fires, releases, and explosions are identified as lagging indicators. API also concludes 
leading indicators can be treated as performance indicators that represent the challenges 
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to incident prevention, management systems, and safety objectives. The definition of 
CCPS metrics guidelines and the API document are well documented. CCPS recently 
updated their Process Safety Leading and Lagging Metrics to consolidate the definition 
of process safety metrics from both API and CCPS.  
More importantly, the differentiation of lagging and leading indicators is not very 
important. Simply separating them as two independent items is not accepted. They are 
working together as a whole system to enhance the implementation of PSM. The 
correlation of lagging and leading can be displayed in Fig. 2 as below. Fig. 2 illustrates 
the fact that lagging and leading indicators should be tracked in the same scale. In this 
scale arrow, lagging indicators are listed on the left side, while leading indicators are 
shown on the right side. The direction of the arrow states lagging indicators represent 
process or behavioral deficiencies, gaps, or losses. The occurrence of past incident 
events help us to identify lessons learned. While, leading indicators evaluate the process 
safety management completeness and improve risk elimination in the organizations.  
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Fig. 2. Process Safety Lagging and Leading Synthesis Scale 
 
1.3 Motivation and Objective 
As aforementioned, although lagging and leading metrics share equivalent 
importance in measuring process safety activities, the aim of this research is dedicated to 
propose novel process safety lagging metrics. By comparing various normalization 
methods, this research observes what methods can give better profiles in describing 
process safety performance. There are two major reasons that encourage us to focus on 
lagging metrics normalization: the advantages of lagging metrics and the inadequacy of 
existing lagging metrics.  
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1.3.1 The advantages of lagging metrics 
Lagging metrics are typically used to display incident statistics and inputs in risk 
analysis. The incident information offers valuable data for revealing potential hazards or 
near misses before major incidents manifest, as indicated by lagging indicators. The 
lagging metrics have been used as ultimate measurements to help management 
understand system deficiencies at an early stage.  
Compared with leading metrics, lagging metrics have several advantages to be 
studied. First of all, process lagging metrics have been broadly accepted and used as a 
well-defined, practical, and efficient tool by organizations. A well-defined lagging 
metric means it has a clear definition and certain criteria. Lagging metrics are practical, 
because they can be easily used by any employee to access the indicators by following 
the criteria and documentation. Lagging metrics also capture valuable process 
information and give correct results through simple calculation.  
Secondly, various types of lagging metrics (such as absolute, indices or 
normalized metrics) have been used frequently to communicate the incident learning. 
Particularly, it was found that normalization of incident profiles is the preferred method 
to convey the finding appropriately. Normalizing process safety lagging indicators 
through additional process-related values provides a comprehensive interpretation for 
incidents data. However, leading metrics tend to detect a completeness of operational or 
management activities, and this approach can hardly involve process information into 
data statistics.  
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Next, lagging indicators could be used to benchmark an organization’s 
performance by showing the trends, improvements or degradations against safety goals 
within or outside organizations. Lagging metrics can provide the potential list of 
contributing hazards, events, or failures for management to fix. “Incident rate” from the 
metrics allow an effective benchmark since the dimensionless scale eliminates the issues 
that differ in organization size and process-difference. Moreover, normalized lagging 
metrics are easily understood by non-technical personnel, such as administration 
officials, stakeholders and general parties. On the contrary, leading metrics show their 
limitations when comparisons for sites, organizations, or industries are required. 
Finally, the effectiveness of process safety indicators requires an accurate 
reporting system and follows the right metrics. Processing industries started collecting 
information on equipment reliability, process failures, operator failures and other 
incident details decades ago. However, the development of leading indicators is a rising 
topic which has not been fully implemented for every industry. Currently, adopting the 
comprehensive process lagging metrics will meet the expectation of establishing good 
safety culture. Decision-making equipped with proper process lagging metrics results 
often provides the cost-effective solution.  
 
1.3.2 The inadequacy of existing lagging metrics 
As mentioned above, the normalization of incident rates is a powerful tool to 
compare the safety performance within or outside companies. CCPS and API RP 754 
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suggest using the total work hours as the normalization factor. Process safety total 
incident rate is the core normalization method as shown below: 
Process Safety Total Incident Rate = Total Process Safety Incidents × 200,000Total Employee &Contractor Work Hours 
          (1) 
where, the 200,000 stands for 200,000 hours per year as a standard factor. The 
factor is calculated from 100 workers working 8 hours a day, 5 days a week, and 50 
weeks per year. In order to incorporate detailed information for process safety incidents, 
a severity-weighted matrix has been developed to score the severity of each incident (see 
Appendix A). The process safety incident severity rate is displayed as following: Process Safety Incident Severity Rate
= Total Severity Score for all PS Incidents × 200,000Total Employee & Contractor Work Hours  
          (2) 
Utilizing the definition of process safety incidents described in CCPS and API 
RP 754, a variety of rate-based metrics can be generated for process safety performance 
benchmarking. However, only work hours have been used as a denominator for lagging 
metrics normalization. The reasons for CCPS and API RP 754 to use the total work 
hours as the normalization factor are it is still widely used and accepted, easily 
understood and recognized by external parties. However, the reliance on work hours has 
been argued within industries, there is an urgent need to explore alternative 
denominators by understanding the incident rate and the corresponding process 
deficiencies. In some cases, the total work hours are calculated by only accounting the 
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number of employees and contractors. However, the actual works hours of employees 
and contractors are usually more than the product of workforce numbers and the work 
hours per worker. This action certainly degrades the precision of normalized incident 
rates. Moreover, this denominator only reflects limited and unspecified process 
information. New metrics should be developed to meet the need of acquiring specified 
metrics in different process industries. Normalization factors reflect process information, 
risks, and manufacturing complexity, which should be considered in new lagging metrics 
trial. Motivated by this purpose, this research is trying to find more consistent, broad, 
and unbiased metrics for a process safety measurement. Good process safety metrics 
must consider the reality of the organization; metrics should be captured upon real 
situations and indeed needs. Uniformed comparisons of metrics could be broadly applied 
across companies, these metrics should also be easily understood by operators, 
management or top executives by simplified or visualized form. Potential denominators 
have been tested and verified via companies’ published data. A benchmark between 
existing and proposed metrics is expected to provide insight on how to determine metrics’ 
appropriateness. 
 
1.3.3 Objectives  
As aforementioned, lagging metrics play an important role by describing 
organizational process safety performance. The determination of lagging metrics forms 
could help an organization in conducting an effective benchmark. However, using the 
unitary form to normalize process lagging indicators should be avoided. More relevant 
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denominators can be introduced in expanding a diversity of process lagging metrics. To 
address the issues mentioned above, the objectives of this research are as follows: 
1. Categorizing oil & gas processing industries into several sections depending 
on their specified products or processes. Currently, all processing industries 
adopt the same metric to normalize incident rate. However, due to the 
differences of each classification, specialized metrics which involve every 
category’s detailed process information and typical parameters are required. 
 
2. Employing lagging metrics normalization method in process safety 
measurement. To address this issue, the research effort focuses on finding 
more consistent, broad, and unbiased metrics for tracking process safety 
using validated data, particularly data related to the process related risks 
involved in the individual industry segments. 
 
3. Performing quantitative and/or qualitative analysis for proposed process 
lagging metrics to ensure their appropriateness. How to determine the 
feasibility of potential metrics is the key issue which needs to be solved by 
the assessment. The acceptable lagging metric uses work hours as the 
denominator would be treated as the standard when benchmarking occurs for 
every possible metric.  
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2. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
 This research focuses on selecting appropriate process lagging metrics to 
evaluate and monitor the organizational process safety performance. The research 
hypothesis is that effective process safety metrics should be sensitive in analyzing any 
change and reliable in helping the industries to prevent any near-miss or accident. The 
methodology used in this research is summarized in Fig. 3. 
 
 
Fig. 3. Research Methodology Diagram 
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An explicit description of process safety lagging metric functions, along with its 
definition and criteria, were covered in the first section. The methodology diagram is 
developed to achieve the three objectives. Similarly, three major procedures have been 
identified as: classification and data collection, alternative metrics application, and 
results analysis and comparison. 
 
2.1 Classification and Data Collection 
The first step is to search and identify industry data for metrics normalization. 
Over 45 companies’ information has been integrated into data collection. Subsequently, 
effort had been made to classify process industries into four business segments 
(integrated oil and gas, exploration and production, chemicals, and drilling contractors). 
Those four categories represent most typical oil & gas processing industries, thus the 
selection of data from those four classified categories becomes more specified.  
 
2.2 Alternative Metrics Application 
The normalization of incident rates is a powerful benchmarking method; it 
compares the safety performance either within or outside process plants. Potential 
lagging metrics were assigned to each industrial category based on different process 
information. The corresponding incident rate was obtained by applying company data 
for proposed process-related metrics. CCPS and API RP 754 suggest using of the total 
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work hours as the normalization denominator in lagging metric. This thesis explored the 
possibility of applying alternative metrics, setting time-based metric as standard.  
 
2.3 Results Analysis and Comparison 
Incident profiles that were generated from existing and proposed metrics have 
been analyzed through quantitative and qualitative assessment. During the quantitative 
analysis, a unitization method was employed to transfer original incident rate profiles 
into the same range. The normalized process safety incident rates were presented in a 
time-series graph. Trend line of each metric was used to compare between potential and 
existing process metrics. Moreover, the coefficient determination values of trend line 
model have been obtained to depict the fitness of linear regression. The results of 
quantitative assessment showed that proposed metrics could have the potential to 
describe process safety performance. Finally, the qualitative approach identified some 
criteria for deciding an effective metric. Qualitative features were discussed for selecting 
process metrics. Metrics that only satisfy the quantitative validation but do not contain 
process characteristics have been excluded. The combined quantitative and qualitative 
assessment ensured the appropriateness of conclusions.     
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3. PROCESS CLASSIFICATION AND DATA COLLECTION 
 
API (API, 2010) provides the process safety indicators pyramid that includes 
lagging and leading indicators in Fig. 4:  
 
 
Fig. 4. Process Safety Indicators Pyramid (API, 2010) 
 
This 4 tiers pyramid categorizes Lost of Primary Containment (LOPC) events of 
greater or lesser consequence as lagging indicators in Tier 1 and 2, while challenges to 
safety systems, operating discipline & management system performance indicators are 
recognized as leading indicators in Tier 3 and 4. Driven by the similar philosophy of 
Heinrich’s (Heinrich, 1931) famous accident pyramid, a correlation exists between less-
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severe and major personal incidents that can lead to a pyramid hierarchy. In this pyramid, 
leading indicators (lower level indicators) identify deficiencies and suggest corrective 
solutions before high consequence events (top level indicators) happen.  
The typical normalized process metric form has been displayed in equation 1. A 
normalization method divides numerator by any reasonable denominator to obtain 
dimensionless rates for comparison. In this thesis, the number of process safety incidents 
is used as the numerator, along with various denominators (such as production volume, 
energy consumption, work hours, drilling depth capacity, etc) have been studied to 
construct potential process lagging metrics. 
 
3.1 Process Safety Incidents Definition 
CCPS categorize process safety incidents (Tier-1as API-754) and process safety 
events (Tier-2 as API-754) as lagging indicators. An incident is reported as a process 
safety incident based on certain criteria (CCPS, 2011): 
• Any occurrence of employee or contractor “day away from work” injury, fatality, 
or hospital admission must have a process directly involved. For most process 
and production industries, it is important to have this criterion applied to exclude 
non-process incidents. 
• An unwanted release of material includes toxic, flammable or non-hazardous 
material but could cause potential consequences over thresholds. Those 
uncontrolled releases might impact personal safety, environment and property. 
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• Accidents that happen in employee or contractor operating areas (production, 
refining, transportation, refrigeration, utilities) can be identified as process safety 
incidents.  
Process safety events follow the same criteria of process safety incidents which 
have less consequence. With the definition of process safety incidents and events by 
CCPS, lagging metrics represent not only the catastrophic but also less severe process 
incidents. In this research, the number of process safety incidents is used as a numerator 
for all proposed process lagging metrics. Unfortunately, the exact process safety incident 
data under the definition of CCPS and API cannot be found in all industries. Process 
safety incident is a new lagging indicator which has not been emphasized for long time. 
Therefore, similar or substituted lagging indicators have been plugged as the numerators 
in metrics testing. However, it strongly suggests revalidate those process metrics once 
adequate process safety incidents have been obtained. 
 
3.2 Data Collection 
Validating the feasibility of alternative denominators needs sufficient historical 
data. Industrial performance data can be collected through company publications. In 
order to select appropriate data for testing the magnitude and function of potential 
lagging metrics, all the industrial companies have been classified into 4 categories. They 
are: integrated oil and gas, exploration and production, chemicals, and drilling 
contractors. Over 45 representative companies have been evaluated to sustain credible 
data. The major portion of the candidates are U.S based companies, but quite big and 
 21 
influential enterprises world-wide (UAE, Australia, Canada, UK, Papua New Guinea, 
Taiwan, etc) are involved in data searching. Moreover, most U.S companies have been 
involved in CCPS’s process safety incident database program.  Data from those 
companies is valuable and convincing. All the data can be found through companies’ 
websites, annual reports, annual sustainability reports, corporate social responsibility 
reports and performance data charts. Table 1 provides a summary of the companies by 
category. 
 
Table 1 Processing Company by Category 
Integrated Oil and Gas 
Abu Dhabi National Oil 
Company (UAE) BG Group (U.K) BP 
Cairn Energy (United 
Kingdom) Chesapeake Energy Cheniere Energy 
Chevron ConocoPhillips Devon Energy 
Encana El Paso Corp ExxonMobil 
Hess Corporation Oil Search (Papua New Guinea) Shell 
Statoil (Norway) Total W&T Offshore 
Exploration and Production 
Anadarko Petroleum Apache BHPbilliton Petroleum (Australia) 
Cabot Oil & Gas Marathon Oil Nexen (Canada) 
New Field Exp OXY Talisman (Canada) 
Woodside Petroleum 
Limited(Australia)   
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Table 1 Continued 
Chemicals 
Air Product Akzo Noble (Dutch) Bristol-Myers Squibb 
Celanese The Dow Chemical Company Dupont 
Eastman Chemical 
Company Huntsman Formosa 
Lyondellbasell   
Drilling Contractor 
Nobel Corporation Parker Drilling Rowan 
Transocean   
 
 
In this research, historical data is a major resource that provides the basis for 
process-related lagging metrics. Although over 45 enterprises have been reviewed for 
the data collection, not all companies’ data can be utilized. A lack of long period records 
or no appropriate data is the critical issue. Typical data is selected for this research based 
on its consistent availability. By doing this, the results become more convincing and 
suitable for industries. All available data (may also include calculated data) is 
summarized in Appendix B-E for reference. 
3.3 Data Acquisition for Different Categories 
3.3.1 Integrated oil and gas 
Oil and natural gas industries make up most of the world-wide energy production. 
Basically, integrated oil and gas industries have multiple processes and products, 
 23 
including oil and natural gas production, refinery throughput, and petrochemical 
production. The data used for metrics testing in this section is gathered from over 20 
companies. American Petroleum Institute (API) Recommended Practice 754 states 
process safety management is important for refinery and petrochemical companies. This 
documentation also advocates that refinery and petrochemical companies should record 
process safety incidents as the key indicator after 2010. In addition, sufficient data 
records and various process related indices are provided from those company reports. 
Unfortunately, for this research, the number of process safety incidents is not available; 
since all the companies just started recording process safety incidents after API RP 745 
was issued. Therefore, the most similar reported indicator-operational oil spills is used 
for lagging metrics testing as a proper substitute. The major related data was obtained for 
this section as follows: 
• Process and environmental incidents (operational oil spills) 
• Total oil production volume 
• Total natural gas production volume 
• Total oil and gas equivalent production volume 
• Total refinery throughput volume 
• Total petrochemical production volume 
• Exposure time for employees and contractors 
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3.3.2 Exploration and production 
This section is considered as a single process derived from integrated oil and gas 
industries. Due to a lack of process safety incident data, an assumption has been made. 
For the exploration and production group, a personal incident case such as days-away 
from work or recordable injury and illness is the major safety indicator. Personal safety 
data has been applied as the numerator for lagging metrics testing, because it is also an 
element of process safety incidents. The data for this group contains: 
• Personal incident data (as comparison) 
• Total oil and gas equivalent production volume 
• Total direct energy consumption 
• Exposure time for employees and contractors 
 
3.3.3 Chemicals 
The American Chemistry Council (ACC) encourages U.S. chemical companies 
to track annual process safety incidents since 1995. However, some historical data do not 
follow the same definition as CCPS suggested. Most chemical companies have recorded 
at least 5 years of process safety incidents (under CCPS’s definition) which are helpful 
for metrics validation. The following information was obtained within the chemical 
industries: 
• Process safety incidents 
• Total chemical production volume 
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• Total direct energy consumption 
• Total net chemical sales 
• Exposure time for employees and contractors 
 
3.3.4 Drilling contractors 
Similar to the exploration and production industries, drilling companies have not 
typically recorded related process incidents. The International Association of Drilling 
Contractor (IADC), the international organization for drilling industries, shows no data 
collection for process safety incidents. Thus, the assumption that uses personal safety 
data as a numerator will be applied for drilling contractors. Drilling business differs from 
those industries shown above. Rig utilization and operating time are critical indicators 
for drilling industries rather than production volume. Data to be obtained within this 
section are: 
• Personal incident data (as comparison) 
• Total drilling depth capacity 
• Total operating days 
• Total drilling depth 
• Exposure time for employees and contractors 
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4. ALTERNATIVE METRICS APPLICATION 
 
Process safety metrics aim to track process-related lagging indicators, and their 
corresponding activities versus a target that identifies areas for improvement. Biased or 
short-term metrics may lead to misunderstanding of safety performance. BP Texas City 
incident is the strong evidence that adequate personal safety indications can cause 
overconfidence for process safety performance. Process safety metrics ensure the 
magnitude of performance monitoring, while using a single metric should be avoided in 
case of possible complacency. The fulfillment of process safety metrics identifies the 
way to measure past or current performance against a threshold.  
 
4.1 Proposed Metrics Demonstration for Each Category 
4.1.1 Integrated oil and gas 
After reviewing over 20 integrated oil and gas enterprises’ annual reports, the 
daily production volume has been used as an important operating indicator. Thus, daily 
production volume can severe as a potential denominator for the process lagging metrics 
in this category.  
As discussed in the data collection section, the process and environmental 
incident (operational oil spills) is used instead of process safety incident (under CCPS 
definition). This assumption is made for two reasons: first of all, actual process safety 
incidents are not available since not enough data has been reported by oil and gas 
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enterprises. Secondly, operational oil spill is a critical process-related incident, which 
has been emphasized by most companies. Therefore, although several products’ volume 
is found, only denominators relevant with an oil production process can be used for 
testing metrics. Crude oil production along with oil and gas equivalent production are 
considered as suitable denominators.  
Appropriate scale factors are needed for normalization. Standard factor is used to 
enlarge the rates when the value of denominators is too big. As seen in equation 1, 
200,000 work hours have been multiplied with the number of process safety incidents. 
The selection of standard factors should consider the unit and magnitude of their 
corresponding denominators.  
Production volume of crude oil is usually measured by barrels per day. Natural 
gas production volume is measured by cubic feet of production per day. Production 
volume of oil and natural gas intends to reflect process performance. Integrated oil and 
gas industries typically combine crude oil and natural gas volumes in the same unit-
Barrel of Oil Equivalent (BOE). This unit converts natural gas production to equivalent 
crude oil production. One BOE is roughly equivalent to 5,800 cubic feet of natural gas. 
However, there are no certain criteria for determining the value of a standard factor. 
Applying a standard factor for process lagging metrics avoids generating too small 
numerical value, but the actual value of this standard factor would not impact the 
estimation of an incident rate as long as the value is reasonable. Thus, in this research, 
assigning a standard factor value which enables a proper incident rate in process lagging 
metrics is more important. In other words, the given standard factors would be accepted 
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when they can adjust incident rates into a relative close range. Particularly, since the 
time-based metric is broadly applied in real industries and treated as a standard in latter 
analysis, its incident rate’s numeric magnitude can be considered for other metrics. The 
determination of standard factor values in this category are based on the report of Daniel 
Johnston (Johnston, 1996), US Energy Information Administration (EIA, 2011), and 
companies’ real data. For scale consideration, a value of 300 thousand barrels has been 
used for Equation 3:  
Process Safety Incidents/Total Crude Oil Production: 
Process Safety Incident Rate = Total Process Safety Incidents × 300,000 BarrelsTotal Oil Production Volume  
          (3) 
Similarly, a value of 500 thousand barrels is adopted as standard factor for metric 
of Equation 4. Since the denominator used in this metric incorporates natural gas 
production, the standard factor value has been amplified by considering this issue.  
Process Safety Incidents/Total Oil and gas equivalent production: 
Process Safety Incident Rate = Total Process Safety Incidents × 500,000 BarrelsTotal Oil and gas equivalent production Volume  
          (4) 
By doing this, those incident profiles that are generated from our proposed 
metrics would be generally close to each other, which is very important for industries to 
use friendly. Obtaining relative close incident rate magnitude is a key criterion in 
determining standard factors’ value. In this research, all standard factor values are 
acquired based on this criterion for their proposed metrics.   
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In addition, natural gas production, refinery throughput, and petrochemical 
production are potential denominators that can be tested if data is available. This 
research gives their corresponding metrics as follows:  
Process Safety Incident/Refinery Throughput: 
Process Safety Incident Rate = Total Process Safety Incidents × 1,000,000 BarrelsTotal Refinery Throughput  
          (5) 
Process Safety Incident/Total Natural Gas Production: 
Process Safety Incident Rate = Total Process Safety Incidents × Billion Cubic Feet Total Natural Gas Production Volume  
          (6) 
Process Safety Incident/Total Petrochemical Production: 
Process Safety Incident Rate = Total Process Safety Incidents × 10,000 Tons Total Petrochemical Production Volume  
          (7) 
Currently, those three process safety lagging metrics cannot be tested because no 
corresponding numerators can be found. As mentioned before, operational oil spills are 
used as the numerator in metrics testing. Denominators such as natural gas production, 
refinery throughput, and petrochemical might not truly reflect their relationship with oil 
spill incidents. Thus, those three are not the most suitable metrics in normalizing 
operational oil spills. With additional study of process safety incidents, more 
comparisons could be carried out to extend the diversity of metrics.  
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4.1.2 Exploration and production 
Exploration and production industries usually report their production capacity by 
using BOE (Barrel of Oil Equivalent), which is the same unit mentioned in integrated oil 
and gas category. Unfortunately, process safety incidents record cannot be found for this 
section. To test the metrics’ appropriateness, an assumption has been introduced. 
Personal safety data has been used for the metric in exploration and production 
industries. The metric suitable for this section is: 
Injury or Illness Incident/Total Oil and gas equivalent production: 
Injury or Illness Incident Rate = Total Injury or Illness  Incidents × 500,000 BarrelsTotal Oil and Gas Prodution Volume  
          (8) 
 
4.1.3 Chemicals 
Process safety incidents statistics are readily found for chemical companies. The 
American Chemistry Council (ACC) suggests that process safety incidents should be 
reported by all its member companies. However, chemical production volume is rarely 
reported based on an examination of chemical companies’ reports. Production volume of 
chemicals could be tested when corresponding data is available. In addition, financial 
indicators and energy consumption have been analyzed by their metrics. Alternative 
metrics that have been explored for chemical industries are:  
Process Safety Incident/Total Chemical Production: 
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Process Safety Incident Rate = Process Safety Incidents × 10,000 TonsChemical Products Volume  
          (9) 
Process Safety Incident/Total Net Income or Net Sale: 
Process Safety Monetary Loss Ratio = Total Process Safety Incidents × 1,000,000Total Net Income or Net Sale  
          (10) 
Process Safety Incident/Total Energy Consumption: 
Process Safety Incident Rate = Process Safety IncidentsEnergy Comsuption (Tera− joules) 
          (11) 
 
4.1.4 Drilling contractor 
Drilling industries’ unique characteristic has been described in the data collection 
section, this particularity inspires the trial for several metrics. In the drilling sector, 
companies’ data includes drilling depth capacity, total operating days, and drilling depth, 
which are critical indices reflecting the work capability of a company. The total drilling 
depth capacity is calculated by considering annual utilization: Total Drilling Depth Capacity= Drilling Depth Capacity of Each Rig × Average Rig Utilization 
          (12) 
Table 2 shows the example of annual utilization of a rig for Noble Corporation.  
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Table 2 Average Rig Utilization Data for Noble Corporation 
Average Rig Utilization Percentage 
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Jackups 97% 97% 97% 97% 92% 82% 79% 
Semisubmersibles>6,000(1) 72% 95% 100% 99% 96% 98% 86% 
Semisubmersibles<6,000 100% 95% 87% 89% 100% 100% 86% 
Drillships 60% 91% 100% 89% 67% 91% 89% 
Submerisibles 94% 81% 92% 73% 66% 51% 11% 
(1) Semisubmersibles have drilling depth capacity greater than 6,000 feet 
 
Again, no process safety incidents have been reported within all drilling 
contractors. Thus, the same assumption for exploration and production works here for 
revealing personal safety performance. Metrics developed for drilling contractors are as 
follows:  
Total Injury or Illness Incident/Drilling Depth Capacity: 
Total Injury or Illness Rate = Total Recordable Incidents × 10,000 FeetTotal Drilling Depth Capacity  
          (13) 
Total Injury or Illness Incident/Operating Days: 
Total  Injury or Illness Rate = Total Recordable Incidents × 100 DaysTotal Operating Days  
          (14) 
Total Injury or Illness Incident/Drilling Depth: 
Total  Injury or Illness Rate = Total Recordable IncidentsTotal Drilling Depth  
          (15) 
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5. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
In this section, quantitative and qualitative assessments will be used to compare 
normalized incident rates generated by different process lagging metrics. To address the 
difficulty in interpreting data sets caused by confusing patterns and unwanted bias, 
quantitative analysis was selected for the analysis. This method allows the user to 
modify variables of interest in mathematical form and makes a comparison of results. In 
addition, those proposed metrics which are eligible after quantitative analysis would be 
revalidated by essential characteristics of good metrics.  
 
5.1 Quantitative Basis 
In this section, normalized incident rates were plotted in time-series graphs, 
which depict changes over a relatively long period of years. Here, the safety 
performance evaluation results were presented by displaying a series of data sets in plots 
to aid in identifying and visualizing any improvement (or retrogress). In order to keep a 
consistent graphic construction, the x-axis was divided into equal intervals to represent 
time scale. Similarly, the y-axis was used to show the variable of interest (such as 
incident ratio numbers).  
First of all, process safety metrics proposed for integrated oil and gas industries 
would be tested. A case study has been demonstrated by using ExxonMobil’s data. 
Process safety incident rate profiles have been generated through suitable metrics. Here 
Equation 3, 4 (author’s contribution) and 1 (CCPS metric) were the selected metrics for 
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evaluating and comparing the input denominators (crude oil production volume, oil and 
gas equivalent production volumes and hours worked, respectively). Then the selected 
metrics are tested using the ExxonMobil’s data set (shown in Table 3) to generate three 
incident profiles, for validating the proposed metrics as depicted in Equation 1, 3 and 4. 
Table 3 summarizes the number of process safety incidents (operational oil spills) and 
three process incident rates derived from different metrics:  
 
Table 3 ExxonMobil’s Performance Data  
Process safety incident number (number of oil spills) 
Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 
 567 465 474 370 
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 
 295 252 211 241 
Year 2010    
 210    
Process safety incident rate/Crude oil production (per 300,000 barrels) 
Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 
 0.187 0.152 0.152 0.121 
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 
 0.090 0.079 0.072 0.083 
Year 2010    
 0.071    
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Table 3 Continued  
Process safety incident rate/Oil and gas production (per 500,000 BOE) 
Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 
 0.183 0.152 0.154 0.125 
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 
 0.095 0.083 0.074 0.084 
Year 2010    
 0.065    
Process safety incident rate/Hours worked (per 200,000 hours) 
Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 
 0.616 0.528 0.551 0.440 
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 
 0.360 0.311 0.264 0.298 
Year 2010    
 0.250    
 
 
Fig. 5 shows the generated incident rate profiles that have been normalized by 
the three different metrics. The two profiles generated by proposed process metrics seem 
to overlap with each other, but they significantly differ from time-based profile, which 
will bring the difficulty to compare these profiles visually. A hypothesis could be given 
here: have standard factors or denominators been properly chosen for metrics? However, 
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using the same Equation 1, 3 and 4 for another company’s data, an opposite example has 
been displayed in Fig. 6. Applying same three metrics for BP’s data, all profiles 
generated by process metrics are very close to each other. Therefore, those two examples 
reject the hypothesis mentioned above. In order to eliminate any fluctuations (as seen 
from the PSI/HW trend in Fig. 5) arising from using different standard factors, a 
statistical method known as ‘unitization’ was developed for this purpose. 
 
 
Fig. 5. Process Safety Incident Profiles by Different Metrics (ExxonMobil Data) 
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Fig. 6. Process Safety Incident Profiles by Different Metrics (BP Data) 
 
5.1.1 Unitization of incident rates 
The challenge presented in normalized incident rates is their profiles would be 
influenced by different standard factors or denominators. Once original incident profiles 
cannot be shown in the same scale, it would be very difficult for analyzing their 
similarity visually. Only based on visual judgment, the true relationship between trends 
can be hardly concluded. Thus, introducing any method to solve this problem is very 
critical for subsequent analysis. Unitization is the method to transfer incident rates from 
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When every point in the normalized incident rate curve is unified, each point is 
converted to a relative value based on the distribution of total population, generating a 
new unified incident profile. By doing this, biased visual judgment could be avoided.  
 Unitization has been widely used in unifying data sets. This unified curve can be 
generated using the following Equation 16:  
minmax
min
YY
YY
Y iU −
−
=                                               (16) 
where, YU stands for the unified value of incident rates, Yi stands for the incident 
rate in certain year, Ymax and  Ymin stand for the maximum and minimum incident rates, 
respectively, over the time period under study of available data. 
 Using Equation 16 for linear unitization of the results obtained in Fig. 5, the 
unitized incident rates corresponding to each process safety incident profile were 
obtained and displayed in Table 4 and Fig. 7. As seen in Fig. 7, the green curve is the 
process incident profile normalized by time-based metric (CCPS approach), the blue 
curve indicates the unitized process safety incident rate normalized by oil production, 
and the red curve represents the unitized process safety incident rate normalized by oil 
and gas equivalent production. It can be inferred from Fig. 7 that the unitized incidents 
generated from proposed metrics are in a close agreement with the time-based metric 
introduced by CCPS. 
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Table 4 Unitized Process Safety Incident Rate (ExxonMobil Data) 
Unitized process safety incident rate/Crude oil production (per 300,000barrels) 
Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 
 1.000  0.699  0.695 0.427 
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 
 0.166 0.069 0.007  0.102  
Year 2010    
 0     
Unitized process safety incident rate/Oil and gas production (per 500,000BOE) 
Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 
 1.000  0.733  0.754 0.506 
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 
 0.259  0.151 0.076 0.163 
Year 2010    
 0    
Unitized process safety incident rate/Hours worked (per 200,000 hours) 
Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 
 1.000 0.760 0.822 0.520 
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 
 0.300 0.167 0.038 0.130 
Year 2010    
 0    
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Fig. 7. Process Safety Incident Rate after Unitization 
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describe the behavior of the observed data. By using a trend line, the user could 
distinguish any tendency from the proposed metrics as compared to the time-based 
metric. If the incident profiles generated from the proposed metrics closely match the 
profile resulting from the time-based metric, then the proposed metrics could be used to 
evaluate the performance of surveyed data. It could be inferred that the tested metrics 
would function properly similar to the accepted time-based metric. 
The detailed steps to interpret the trend line quantitatively can be found 
elsewhere (Cacha, 1997). A brief description is provided here, with the focus of applying 
the trend line to the unified incident rate profiles as shown in Table 5. 
Step 1: Use X variable to represent the year distribution. By arranging the year 
distribution from the lowest value to the highest value (from years 2002 to 2010) and 
picking the middle one (year 2006) as the median, the user can assign 0 for this center 
point. The remaining data sets in X variable (years) are presented in either ascending or 
descending sequences, starting from the center point by the interval value of 1. The next 
move is labeling incident rates as Y variable for each corresponding X value. The fourth 
column in Table 5 is the product of X and Y values, while the fifth column is the square 
value of X. Table 5 shows the results generated from the unitized process safety incident 
rates described above (divided by crude oil production-per 300,000 barrels) for the 
ExxonMobil case study. 
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Table 5 Calculations for Constructing a Trend Line 
Year X Y XY X2 
2002 -4 1 -4 16 
2003 -3 0.699 -2.097 9 
2004 -2 0.695 -1.39 4 
2005 -1 0.427 -0.427 1 
2006 0 0.166 0 0 
2007 1 0.069 0.069 1 
2008 2 0.007 0.014 4 
2009 3 0.102 0.306 9 
20010 4 0 0 16 
Sum  3.165 -7.525 60 
 
 
Step 2: Use a linear regression model to explain the correlation between X and Y 
using the regression model: bXaY += . Because there is only one independent variable 
X in the model, it is considered as a simple linear regression model. In the regression 
models, the independent variables are also referred to as repressors or predictor variables. 
The slope and intercept values for the linear model can be generated using Eqns. 17 and 
18. Y is the incident rate for a particular year, X is the value assigned to this year. From 
Table 5, the user can find slope and interception, respectively.  
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where, Xi is the assigned value for the annual distribution, Yi is the incident rate 
for a particular year. N is the number of the samples.  
Step 3: The fitted linear trend line can be constructed using the following 
Equation: 352.0125.0 +−= XY  
As seen in Fig. 8, all trend lines are almost parallel to each other, which results in 
a similar slope value (around -0.13) for all cases. This corresponds to the incident rate 
profiles, which linearly decrease over time. The rapid decrease of the incident rate 
profiles might indicate the improvement made in the process safety performance. 
Moreover, the parallel trend lines also indicate that the alternative denominators (i.e., oil 
production, oil and gas equivalent production) proposed in this study can be used 
alternatively to evaluate the annual safety performance (instead of the work hours 
denominator).   
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Fig. 8. Trend Lines for Unitized Process Safety Incident Profiles 
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where, Xi is the assigned value for the annual distribution, Yi is the incident rate 
for a particular year, and N is the number of data sets. Table 6 shows the calculated R2 
value for the linear regression of trend lines in Fig. 8. 
 
Table 6 Coefficient Determination Value for Unitized Trend Line 
Unitized Process safety incident rate / Crude oil production (per 300,000 barrels) 
Coefficient Determination-R2 Coefficient Determination-R2 
Unitized Process safety incident rate / Oil and gas production (per 500,000 BOE) 
Coefficient Determination-R2 Coefficient Determination-R2 
Unitized Process safety incident rate / Hours worked (per 200,000 hours) 
Coefficient Determination-R2 Coefficient Determination-R2 
 
 
As seen in Table 6, the calculated R2 value for all three trend lines is around 0.9. 
When an R2 value is very close to 1, it indicates that the regression line is able to predict 
the trend of a whole population perfectly. Although a significant agreement between the 
actual values and predicted values from the linear model cannot decide which 
denominator is better, high R2 values imply that these trend lines are deemed credible to 
evaluate the distribution of surveyed data.  
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Metrics (crude oil production, oil and gas equivalent production as denominators) 
applied to the ExxonMobil data sets have shown their feasibility to be used as alternative 
lagging metrics. A transverse comparison of trend line slope value has been conducted 
for selected oil and gas companies, as shown in Fig. 9. Fig. 9 shows that the slope values 
employing crude oil production or oil and gas equivalent production have the same trend, 
similar to the time-based metric, in evaluating the process safety performance. Thus, 
these two lagging metrics are valid to be used for integrated oil and gas companies.  
 
Fig. 9. Slope Value Comparisons for Integrated Oil and Gas Metrics 
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5.1.3 Metrics testing 
5.1.3.1 Crude oil production, oil and gas equivalent production 
In summary, following the quantitative assessment of the existing and proposed 
lagging metrics, metrics utilizing oil production and oil and gas equivalent production 
have been validated as credible denominators in addition to work hours denominator. 
Unitized incident profiles neglect the differentiation among various lagging metrics by 
generating a dimensionless scale for trend line comparison. High coefficient 
determination value implies the credibility of a trend line. From the case study and 
transverse comparison for integrated oil and gas category, the slopes of the three unified 
incident profiles are quite similar, following a parallel pattern which indicates the 
potential of using process related parameters as the lagging metric for evaluating the 
safety performance as alternative methods to the existing time-based metric commonly 
used by process industries.  
The next step is to test some potential process related metrics using the actual 
surveyed data. 
 
5.1.3.2 Total energy consumption  
The next step is to test some potential process related metrics using the actual 
surveyed data. Fig. 10 shows process safety incident rate profiles generated from other 
process related metrics using total energy consumption and hours worked as 
denominators. The red curve represents the unitized process safety incident rate derived 
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from work hours denominator, and the blue curve describes the unitized process safety 
incident rate divided by the energy consumption denominator. The trend lines of these 
two profiles are quite identical, with the slope values for both trend lines are fairly close 
to each other. Although they do not exhibit a high linear regression coefficient, the gap 
between the two profiles is quite small. Again, more cases would be brought in to 
observe the metric’s repeatability.  
 
 
Fig. 10. Unitized Process Safety Incident Profiles by Different Metrics (Hess Data) 
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slope values, energy consumption remains another independent variable which should be 
considered as a potential denominator, similar to the work hours, for evaluating process 
safety performance.  
 
Fig. 11. Slope Value Comparisons for Energy Consumption Metric 
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denominators indicate a parallel pattern, while the trend line generated with net income 
denominator shows a dramatic difference in both slope and coefficient determination 
values. This means a metric employing a net sales denominator exhibit the same 
behavior as a time-based metric, which depicts the improvement in process safety 
performance; while the other metric using the net income denominator is not valid. 
Dupont’s data sets present an example where the net income is a not an appropriate 
denominator to use since it differs from other two denominators significantly.  
 
  
Fig. 12. Unitized Process Safety Incident Profiles by Different Metrics (Dupont 
Data) 
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.  
Fig. 13. Slope Value Comparisons for Financial Metrics 
 
The comparison for financial indicators as potential lagging metrics has been 
conducted for chemical companies. From the trend line perspectives, net sales have the 
potential to become a denominator, like the work hours denominator, for all chemical 
industries. It can be concluded from Fig. 13 that the metric utilizing net sale denominator 
provides a similar trend, as time-based metric, in evaluating the process safety 
performance. However, the metric using the net income denominator has not reached 
author’s expectation.  
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5.1.3.4 Chemical production 
Fig. 14 shows the process safety incident rate profiles generated from metrics 
using chemical production volume and hours worked as denominators. The blue curve 
represents the unitized process safety incident rate derived from time-based denominator, 
and the red curve represents the unitized process safety incident rate divided by total 
chemical products volume. The trend lines of the two profiles are quite similar, with the 
slope values for both trend lines are fairly close to each other. Although they are not 
showing high correlation, the gap between the two profiles is quite small. Future studies 
should focus on evaluating this lagging metric with more comprehensive industrial data 
to validate its suitability for evaluating the safety performance of the process industries.   
 
 
Fig. 14. Unitized Process Safety Incident Profiles by Different Metrics (Dow 
Canada Data) 
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Fig. 15 compares the slope values for different chemical companies to prove the 
hypothesis that chemical production volume is a potential denominator for process 
industries. Trend line slope values for incident rate profiles normalized by chemical 
production and hours worked are relatively close to each other. It could be concluded 
that the chemical production volume lagging metric can, in addition to the acceptable 
time-based metric, help management in assessing process safety performance.  
 
 
Fig. 15. Slope Value Comparisons for Chemical Production Metric 
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while process safety incidents record has not been found for drilling industries. However, 
several potential process-related denominators could be captured to evaluate the safety 
performance of drilling industries, as shown in Fig. 16. Here, the numerator is assumed 
to be total recordable incidents. Total recordable incident profiles were generated from 
different lagging metrics utilizing various denominators such as: drilling depth capacity, 
operating days and hours worked. The green curve shows the incident profile derived 
from time-based metric, the blue curve illustrates the unitized total recordable incident 
rate normalized by total drilling depth capacity, while the red curve represents the 
unitized total recordable incident rate divided by operating days. In all cases, all trend 
lines present a parallel pattern, the slope and coefficient determination values are almost 
identical (around 0.8). The slope values are also relatively close as seen in Fig. 17. This 
means drilling depth capacity and operating days lagging metrics follow a similar 
tendency as time-based metric. Parker Drilling and Noble Corporation’s data sets give a 
good example of drilling contractor safety performance. The proposed lagging metrics 
seem to be reasonable and effective.  
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Fig. 16. Unitized Process Safety Incident Profiles by Different Metrics (Parker 
Drilling data) 
 
Fig. 17. Slope Value Comparisons for Drilling Related Metrics 
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Fig. 18 depicts lost workday profiles generated from metrics using total drilling 
depth and hours worked as denominators. The red curve represents the unitized lost 
workday case rate derived from time-based denominator, and the blue curve describes 
the unitized incident rate divided by drilling depth. The trend lines from the two profiles 
have significant differences, resulting in different slope and R2 values.  Woodside data 
sets give an example showing that drilling length is not an appropriate lagging metric to 
be used in evaluating the safety performance since it varies significantly as compared to 
the time-based metric. 
 
 
Fig. 18. Unitized Process Safety Incident Profiles by Different Metrics (Woodside 
data) 
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5.2 Qualitative Basis 
From a qualitative assessment point of view, CCPS’s Guidelines for Process 
Safety Metrics (CCPS, 2009) (Safety 2009) has provided certain criteria to develop an 
effective and credible process safety metrics evaluation. Some of the CCPS criteria are 
modified to fit the scope of this study, while the quantitative results provide justification 
of metrics selection and validation.  
 
5.2.1 Characteristics of good metrics 
5.2.1.1 Reliability and repeatability 
The requirement of metrics is that they can be used repeatedly at different time 
periods, and broad applicability in meeting industry needs. Most denominators proposed 
in this study have shown results in the same range by using various industrial data sets. 
Benchmarking between the accepted time-based metric and the proposed process metrics 
validates the reliability of proposed lagging metrics. In terms of repeatability, it has been 
shown that results from the proposed metrics have been reiterated to a number of 
surveyed industries. The proposed process-related metrics have been tested with 
available data from companies of different categories. From the slope value comparison 
of trend lines, it can be concluded that specified lagging metrics could be used 
universally in their corresponding industries. 
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5.2.1.2 Consistency and independence 
In this research, the unit and definition of each individual denominator is 
consistent throughout the four distinguished groups of companies (integrated oil and gas, 
exploration and production, chemicals, and drilling contractors). The total amount of oil 
and gas production, direct energy consumption, and drilling depth capacity are the 
critical denominators for evaluating process safety performance. For illustration, barrels, 
and barrels of oil equivalent are examples of standard units that have been used broadly. 
Similarly, units such as per cubic feet of production have been used for natural gas, per 
ton for chemical products, and per trillion Joule for energy consumption. The advantage 
of keeping denominator’s consistent will enable benchmarking across organizations. 
Moreover, the selection of potential denominators was developed in this work based on 
real industrial publications. Independence is another important factor to decide the 
selection of denominators. Some denominators have a relatively stable and consistent 
record, while some are not. For example, the net income and annual drilling depth are 
susceptible to market fluctuation. They would be easily impacted by uncertain factors 
that make the data sets change dramatically over a time period. Those denominators do 
not produce good metrics compared with the production volume metric which has a high 
demand and gives a consistent record. 
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5.2.1.3 Process behavior related 
Integrating the process related information in the lagging metric is another key 
element for developing a robust process safety metric. Process output variables have 
been used as denominators, which clearly distinguish process lagging metrics from 
personal injury metrics. Denominators that correlated with process outputs or behaviors 
have been considered in this study, such as various production volume, energy 
consumption, total drilling depth capacity, and operating days. On the contrary, the 
financial denominators should be avoided in evaluating the safety performance. Trial 
results presented in previous section suggested process related metrics give better 
outcomes when analyzing industrial data.  
 
5.2.1.4 Comparability and adequacy 
Another function of lagging metrics is to give internal or external comparisons 
across organization or industries. Good metrics should be able to be compared with other 
similar metrics to give a consensus conclusion. From this study, quantitative results such 
as trend line and coefficient determination values give the visualization outcomes when 
comparing the proposed lagging metrics with the existing time-based metric. In addition, 
results show that selected lagging metrics are potential denominators to be used for 
different companies within the group classification. In this study, most results are 
generated based on industrial data from the public sources. Results using the long-
interval data sets demonstrate the importance of monitoring and evaluating the 
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denominators. Large population data sets make statistical analyses more reliable for 
measuring performance changes.  
 
5.2.1.5 Operability for audience 
Metrics should meet the specific need of the target audience and can be captured 
easily. For instance, production volume is the most interesting indicator for upper 
management. Thus, there is no difficulty in obtaining these data since it has already been 
recorded monthly or even daily. Proposed denominators are regular indicators and 
accessible to any audience. Another point is that those lagging metrics suggested in this 
study can be obtained and calculated easily. They follow the similar form of CCPS’s 
defined time-based lagging metric. The normalized form is developed to be user-friendly 
for operators and EHS management team. 
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6. SUMMARY 
 
The analysis of lagging metrics has been performed using quantitative 
assessment (statistical unitization, trend line comparison, coefficient of determination 
from linear regression) and qualitative evaluation. The results shown in this study 
demonstrate that lagging metrics can be developed using identified process related 
denominators in additional to work hours. Quantitative assessment enables the analysis 
of incident rate profiles mathematically by avoiding biased visual judgments. Qualitative 
evaluation stating only the good features of the metrics could result in an impartial 
decision in selecting the lagging metrics. Normalized incident rate profiles were found to 
be effective in describing process safety performance. Several conclusions can be drawn 
from this research: 
 Grouping the surveyed companies into four business categories served as a 
reference to select corresponding data sets and lagging metrics. The safety 
performance data (such as number of process incidents, production volume, 
energy consumption, etc) were acquired from company publications. They 
have been integrated into the database according to the four categories. 
 
 Normalized lagging metrics were derived in accordance to each identified 
process-based category. The differences in the scope of work in each 
category have been taken into consideration to generate customized lagging 
metrics.  
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 Statistical unitization has been applied to the original incident rate profiles, 
which were normalized by the proposed metrics, to give better insight for 
quantitative assessment. Unitized incident rate profiles neglect the 
differentiation among various lagging metrics by building the dimensionless 
scale for trend line comparison. High coefficient of determination describes 
the credibility of the trend line.  
 
 Trend analysis provided an overall understanding of process safety incidents 
within the four industry categories and served as the key indicators to 
determine the reliability of metrics. The slope value for unified incident rate 
profiles can be seen from the trend line model. The parallel patterns shown 
by most profiles demonstrate the potential of using process related metrics, 
in addition to the time based metric, as alternatives to evaluate the safety 
performance in process industries. 
 
 Process lagging metrics eligible for quantitative assessment have been 
screened based on characteristics of good process metrics to ensure their 
appropriateness. 
 
In summary, metrics using crude oil production, oil and gas equivalent 
production for the integrated oil and gas group; total energy consumption, chemical 
production for chemical industry; operating days, and drilling depth capacity for drilling 
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contractors have been validated as the potential denominators, in additional to the 
commonly used hours worked. Particularly, metrics from their own categories contain 
more specified process information; this trait enables more precise evaluation in 
describing process safety performance. 
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7. FUTURE WORK 
 
The study of process safety performance metrics is an emerging topic advocated 
by the process industries. Future effort should focus on gathering process deficiency 
information (such as reliability, etc) in a categorized database. The database should be 
continuously updated and expanded to provide data sets needed for comprehensive 
analysis and has the potential to serve academic or industrial needs. Users can expand 
this database by adding more information in additional columns, especially, when 
process safety incidents per CCPS definition have been reported. The next step is to use 
the extended data sets to complement the existing proposed metrics, giving more 
accurate description. The next step is to identify other potential lagging metrics from the 
database for other industrial groups. 
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APPENDIX A 
PROCESS SAFETY INCIDENT SEVERITY 
A severity level and point will be assigned for each consequence category for each 
process safety incident by using the criteria (CCPS, 2011) shown in Table 7. 
 
Table 7 Process Safety Incidents & Severity Categories 
Severity 
Level 
Safety/Human 
Health 
Fire or 
Explosion 
(including 
overpressure) 
Potential 
Chemical 
Impact 
Community/Enviro
nment Impact 
N/A 
Does not meet or 
exceed Level 4 
threshold 
Does not 
meet or 
exceed Level 
4 threshold 
Does not meet 
or exceed 
Level 4 
threshold 
Does not meet or 
exceed Level 4 
threshold 
4 
(1 point 
used in 
severity 
rate 
calculation
s for each 
of the 
attributes 
which 
apply to 
the 
incident) 
Injury requiring 
treatment beyond 
first aid to 
employee or 
contractors (or 
equivalent) 
associated with a 
process safety 
incident (In USA, 
incidents meeting 
the definitions of 
an OSHA 
recordable injury) 
Resulting in 
$25,000 to 
$100,000 of 
direct cost 
Chemical 
released within 
secondary 
containment or 
contained 
within the unit 
Short-term 
remediation to 
address acute 
environmental 
impact. 
No long term cost 
or company 
oversight. 
Examples would 
include spill 
cleanup, soil and 
vegetation removal. 
3 
(3 points 
used in 
severity 
rate 
calculation
s for each 
of the 
attributes 
which 
apply to 
the 
Lost time injury to 
employee or 
contractors 
associated with a 
process safety 
event 
Resulting in 
$100,000 to 
1MM of 
direct cost. 
 
Chemical 
release outside 
of containment 
but retained on 
company 
property 
OR 
flammable 
release without 
potential for 
vapor cloud 
explosives 
Minor off-site 
impact with 
precautionary 
shelter-in-place 
OR 
Environmental 
remediation 
required with cost 
less than $1MM. 
No other regulatory 
oversight required. 
OR 
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incident) Local media 
coverage 
2 
(9 points 
used in 
severity 
rate 
calculation
s for each 
of the 
attributes 
which 
apply to 
the 
incident) 
On-site fatality – 
employee or 
contractors 
associated with a 
process safety 
event; multiple lost 
time injuries or one 
or more serious 
offsite injuries 
associated with a 
process safety 
event. 
Resulting in 
$1MM to 
$10MM of 
direct cost. 
Chemical 
release with 
potential for 
injury off site 
or flammable 
release 
resulting in a 
vapor cloud 
entering a 
building or 
potential 
explosion site 
(congested/con
fined area) 
with potential 
for damage or 
casualties if 
ignited 
Shelter-in-place or 
community 
evacuation 
OR 
Environmental 
remediation 
required and cost in 
between $1MM - 
$2.5 MM. State 
government 
investigation and 
oversight of 
process. 
OR 
Regional media 
coverage or brief 
national media 
coverage. 
1 
(27 points 
used in 
severity 
rate 
calculation
s for each 
of the 
attributes 
which 
apply to 
the 
incident) 
Off-site fatality or 
multiple on-site 
fatalities associated 
with a process 
safety event. 
Resulting in 
direct 
cost >$10M
M 
 
Chemical 
release with 
potential for 
significant on-
site or off-site 
injuries or 
fatalities 
National media 
coverage over 
multiple days 
OR 
Environmental 
remediation 
required and cost in 
excess of $2.5 
MM. Federal 
government 
investigation and 
oversight of 
process. 
OR 
other significant 
community impact 
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APPENDIX B 
INTEGRATED OIL AND GAS GROUP DATA AND CALCULATIONS 
BP 
Number of Employees 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 
 107,200 110,150 115,250 103,700 
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 
 102,900 96,200 97,000 98,100 
Year 2008 2009 2010  
 92,000 80,300 79,700  
Total Hours Worked (Million hours-workforce) 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 
 464 503 528 527 
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 
 571 555 443 445 
Year 2008 2009 2010  
 440 408 429  
Fatality (Employee) 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 
 10 5 3 5 
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 
 4 1 0 3 
Year 2008 2009 2010  
 2 0 0  
Fatality (Contractor) 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 
 13 11 10 15 
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 
 7 26 7 4 
Year 2008 2009 2010  
 3 18 14  
Recordable Injury Case (Workforce) 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 
 2726 2392 2012 1604 
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 
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 1513 1471 1067 1060 
Year 2008 2009 2010  
 951 665 1284  
Day Away From Work Case (Workforce) 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 
 450 327 272 239 
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 
 230 305 188 167 
Year 2008 2009 2010  
 175 134 408  
Fatal Accident Rate ( FAR-per 108 hours) 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 
 4.96 3.18 2.46 3.80 
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 
 1.93 4.86 1.58 1.57 
Year 2008 2009 2010  
 1.14 4.41 3.26  
Recordable Incident Frequency (RIF per 200,000 hours worked-workforce) 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 
 1.26 0.95 0.77 0.61 
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 
 0.53 0.53 0.48 0.48 
Year 2008 2009 2010  
 0.43 0.34 0.61  
Day Away From Work Frequency  
(DAFWF per 200,000 hours worked-workforce) 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 
 0.21 0.13 0.1 0.09 
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 
 0.08 0.11 0.085 0.075 
Year 2008 2009 2010  
 0.08 0.069 0.193  
Oil Spill (Loss of primary containment >1 barrel) 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 
 958 810 761 635 
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 
 578 541 417 340 
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Year 2008 2009 2010  
 335 234 261  
Crude Oil Production (Thousand Barrels per day) 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 
 1,928 1,931 2,018 2,121 
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 
 2,531 2,562 2,498 2,414 
Year 2008 2009 2010  
 2,401 2,535 2,374  
Net Natural Gas Production (Million cubic feet per day) 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 
 7,609 8,632 8,707 8,613 
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 
 8,503 8,424 8,536 8,143 
Year 2008 2009 2010  
 8,334 8,485 8,401  
Net Hydrocarbons Production (Thousand Barrel of oil equivalent per day) 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 
 3,240 3,419 3,519 3,606 
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 
 3,997 4,014 3,926 3,818 
Year 2008 2009 2010  
 3,838 3,998 3,822  
Refinery Throughput (Thousand Barrel per day) 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 
 2,928 2,611 2,774 2,723 
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 
 2,607 2,399 2,198 2,127 
Year 2008 2009 2010  
 2,155 2,287 2,426  
Petrochemical Production (Thousand tons per year)  
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 
 9,588 9,699 11,166 12,392 
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 
 13,358 14,076 14,426 14,320 
Year 2008 2009 2010  
 12,835 12,660 15,594  
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CHEVRON 
Number of Employees 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 
 57,327 55,763 53,014 50,582 
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 
 47,265 53,440 55,882 59,162 
Year 2008 2009 2010  
 61,675 59,963 58,267  
Total Hours Worked (Thousand hours-employee) 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 
 114,654 111,526 106,028 101,164 
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 
 94,530 106,880 111,764 118,324 
Year 2008 2009 2010  
 123,350 119,926 116,534  
Fatality (Employee) 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 
 4 2 1 0 
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 
 2 2 1 3 
Year 2008 2009 2010  
 0 0 0  
Fatality (Contractor) 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 
 14 21 15 12 
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 
 15 4 11 14 
Year 2008 2009 2010  
 5 9 5  
Total Recordable Incident Rate (TRIR per 200,000 hours worked-employee) 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 
 0.82 0.72 0.68 0.6 
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 
 0.46 0.38 0.34 0.4 
Year 2008 2009 2010  
 0.31 0.32 0.22  
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Lost-Time Incident Rate (LTIR per 200,000 hours worked-employee) 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 
 0.4 0.34 0.252 0.252 
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 
 0.214 0.168 0.082 0.096 
Year 2008 2009 2010  
 0.066 0.066 0.034  
Oil Spill (Oil, chemicals and drilling fluid spill>1 barrel) 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 
 1553 1428 1502 1145 
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 
 986 846 803 826 
Year 2008 2009 2010  
 760 798 639  
Net Oil and Liquid Production (Thousand Barrels per day) 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 
 1,997 1,959 1,897 1,808 
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 
 1,710 1,669 1,732 1,756 
Year 2008 2009 2010  
 1,649 1,846 1,923  
Net Natural Gas Production (Million cubic feet per day) 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 
 4,466 4,417 4,376 4,292 
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 
 3,958 4,233 4,956 5,019 
Year 2008 2009 2010  
 5,125 4,989 5,040  
Net Oil and gas equivalent production (Thousand Barrel of oil equivalent per 
day) 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 
 2,741 2,695 2,626 2,637 
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 
 2,509 2,517 2,667 2,619 
Year 2008 2009 2010  
 2,530 2,704 2,763  
Refinery Throughput (Thousand Barrel per day) 
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Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 
 6,675 6,256 5,854 5,729 
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 
 5,866 5,608 5,610 5,317 
Year 2008 2009 2010  
 5,287 5,132 5,007  
Refinery capacity (Thousand Barrel per day)  
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 
 2,472 2,079 1,991 1,958 
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 
 2,212 1,989 1,833 1,858 
Year 2008 2009 2010  
 1,878 1,894 2,160  
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CONOCOPHILLIPS 
Number of Employees 
Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 
 N/A N/A N/A 38,400 
Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 
 32,600 33,800 30,015 29,705 
Total Hours Worked (Thousand hours-employee) 
Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 
 N/A N/A N/A 76,800 
Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 
 65,200 67,600 60,030 59,410 
Total Recordable Incident Rate (TRIR per 200,000 hours worked-employee) 
Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 
 N/A N/A N/A 0.68 
Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 
 0.62 0.52 0.4 0.31 
Crude Oil Production (Thousand barrel per day) 
Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 
 934 905 907 972 
Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 
 854 806 968 913 
Natural Gas Production (Millions of cubic feet per day) 
Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 
 3,522 3,317 3,270 4,970 
Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 
 5,087 4,847 4,877 4,606 
Total Oil and gas production (Thousand barrel of oil equivalent per day) 
Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 
 1,541 1,477 1,471 1,829 
Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 
 1,731 1,642 1,809 1,707 
Refinery Crude Oil Processed (Thousand barrel per day) 
Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 
 2,488 2,455 2,420 2,616 
Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 
 2,560 2,416 2,226 2,156 
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EXXONMOBIL 
Number of Employees 
Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 
 92,000 88,000 86,000 84,000 
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 
 82,000 81,000 80,000 81,000 
Year 2010    
 84,000    
Total Hours Worked (Million hours-Employee) 
Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 
 184 176 172 168 
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 
 164 162 160 162 
Year 2010    
 168    
Fatality (Employee) 
Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 
 3 4 0 3 
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 
 3 0 0 4 
Year 2010    
 0    
Fatality (Contractor) 
Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 
 7 19 6 5 
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 
 7 8 5 4 
Year 2010    
 3    
Total Recordable Incident Rate (TRIR per 200,000 hours worked-employee) 
Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 
 0.54 0.41 0.39 0.39 
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 
 0.33 0.33 0.37 0.31 
Year 2010    
 0.23    
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Lost-Time Incident Rate (LTIR per 200,000 hours worked-employee) 
Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 
 0.083 0.07 0.044 0.069 
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 
 0.049 0.031 0.053 0.042 
Year 2010    
 0.043    
Oil Spill (Oil, chemicals and drilling fluid spill>1 barrel) 
Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 
 567 465 474 370 
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 
 295 252 211 241 
Year 2010    
 210    
Total Liquid Production (Thousand Barrels per day) 
Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 
 2,496 2,516 2,571 2,523 
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 
 2,681 2,616 2,405 2,387 
Year 2010    
 2,422    
Natural Gas Production (Million cubic feet per day) 
Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 
 10,452 10,119 9,864 9,251 
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 
 9,334 9,384 9,095 9,237 
Year 2010    
 12,148    
Net Oil and gas equivalent production (Thousand Barrel of oil equivalent per 
day) 
Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 
 4,238 4,203 4,215 4,065 
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 
 4,237 4,180 3,921 3,932 
Year 2010    
 4,447    
Refinery Throughput (Thousand Barrel per day) 
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Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 
 5,400 5,500 5,700 5,700 
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 
 5,600 5,600 5,400 5,400 
Year 2010    
 5,300    
Chemical Production (Thousand Metric tons per year) 
Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 
 26,600 26,600 27,800 26,800 
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 
 27,400 27,500 25,000 24,800 
Year 2010    
 25,900    
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HESS CORPORATION 
Number of Employees 
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 
 11,301 11,975 12,921 12,071 
Year 2008 2009 2010  
 12,432 12,229 12,587  
Fatality (Employee) 
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 
 2 0 0 0 
Year 2008 2009 2010  
 0 0 1  
Total Hours Worked (Thousand hours-employee and contractor) 
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 
 32,650 37,660 51,200 46,900 
Year 2008 2009 2010  
 47,400 44,500 47,700  
Total Recordable Incident Rate (TRIR per 200,000 hours worked-workforce) 
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 
 2.17 1.57 1.04 0.93 
Year 2008 2009 2010  
 0.88 0.64 0.62  
Lost-Time Incident Rate (LTIR per 200,000 hours worked-workforce) 
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 
 N/A N/A 0.41 0.28 
Year 2008 2009 2010  
 0.26 0.22 0.17  
Oil Spill (Oil spill>1 barrel) 
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 
 192 270 115 129 
Year 2008 2009 2010  
 132 122 106  
Gross Operated Hydrocarbon Production/Throughput 
(Thousand barrel of oil equivalent per day) 
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 
 1,170 1,210 1,120 1,392 
Year 2008 2009 2010  
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 1,333 1,392 1,345  
Net Hydrocarbon Production/Throughput  
(Thousand barrel of oil equivalent per day) 
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 
 342 335 359 377 
Year 2008 2009 2010  
 381 408 418  
Direct Energy Usage (Trillion-joules) 
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 
 N/A 37,450 32,600 34,700 
Year 2008 2009 2010  
 43,295 46,126 45,904  
 
  
 83 
SHELL 
Number of Employees 
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 
 96,000 N/A 112,371 112,000 
Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 
 109,000 108,000 104,000 102,000 
Year 2009 2010   
 101,000 97,000   
Total Hours Worked (Thousands hours-workforce) 
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 
 686,275 750,000 737,705 673,913 
Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 
 680,000 660,714 677,419 764,706 
Year 2009 2010   
 869,565 750,000   
Fatality (Workforce) 
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 
 35 51 45 31 
Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 
 34 37 21 26 
Year 2009 2010   
 20 12   
Operational Oil Spill 
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 
 N/A 784 678 711 
Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 
 560 465 392 275 
Year 2009 2010   
 264 193   
Lost Time Injury Rate (LTIR per million hours worked-workforce) 
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 
 1.3 1.1 1.1 1.1 
Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 
 1 0.8 0.7 0.6 
Year 2009 2010   
 0.4 0.3   
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Total Recordable Injury Rate (TRIR per million hours worked-workforce) 
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 
 2.9 2.5 2.6 2.6 
Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 
 2.5 2.1 1.9 1.8 
Year 2009 2010   
 1.4 1.2   
Oil and Liquids Production (Thousand barrel per day) 
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 
 2,211 2,359 2,333 2,173 
Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 
 1,998 1,948 1,818 1,786 
Year 2009 2010   
 1,665 1,723   
Oil and gas equivalent production (Thousand barrel of oil equivalent per day) 
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 
 3,746 3,960 3,905 3,772 
Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 
 3,518 3,473 3,315 3,248 
Year 2009 2010   
 3,142 3,314   
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TOTAL 
Number of Employees 
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 
 122,025 121,469 110,783 111,401 
Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 
 112,877 95,070 96,442 96,959 
Year 2009 2010   
 96,387 92,855   
Total Hours Worked (Million hours-workforce) 
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 
 N/A N/A N/A 397 
Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 
 423 429 432 446 
Year 2009 2010   
 455 466   
Fatality (Workforce) 
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 
 41 14 11 16 
Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 
 22 18 15 8 
Year 2009 2010   
 21 17   
Oil Spill (Loss of primary containment >1 barrel) 
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 
 215 165 286 350 
Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 
 489 708 766 464 
Year 2009 2010   
 458 399   
Lost Time Injury Rate (LTIR per million hours worked-workforce) 
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 
 7.5 5.9 5 3.9 
Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 
 3.6 3 2.4 2.1 
Year 2009 2010   
 1.9 1.6   
 86 
Total Recordable Injury Rate (TRIR per million hours worked-workforce) 
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 
 15.4 11.8 9.5 7.4 
Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 
 6.3 5.1 4.2 3.6 
Year 2009 2010   
 3.1 2.6   
Oil and Liquids Production (Thousand barrel per day) 
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 
 1,497  1,635  1,714  1,741  
Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 
 1,665  1,550  1,550  1,479  
Year 2009 2010   
 1,433  1,404    
Natural Gas Production (Millions of cubic feet per day) 
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 
 4,061 4,532 4,786 4,894 
Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 
 4,780 4,674 4,875 5,000 
Year 2009 2010   
 4,920 5,648   
Oil and gas equivalent production (Thousand barrel of oil equivalent per day) 
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 
 2,197 2,416 2,539 2,585 
Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 
 2,489 2,356 2,391 2,341 
Year 2009 2010   
 2,281 2,378   
Refined Product Capacity (Thousand barrel per day) 
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 
 2,580 2,660 2,696 2,692 
Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 
 2,708 2,700 2,598 2,604 
Year 2009 2010   
 2,594 2,363   
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APPENDIX C 
EXPLORATION AND PRODUCTION GROUP DATA AND CALCULATIONS 
TALISMAN 
Number in Workforce (employees and contractors) 
Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 
 2428 3253 3818 4404 
Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 
 4764 5360 4806 4600 
Total Hours Worked (Thousand hours-workforce) 
Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 
 4,856 6,506 7,636 8,808 
Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 
 9,528 1,072 9,612 9,200 
Lost-time Incident Frequency ( LTIF per million hours worked-workforce) 
Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 
 3.7 2.55 1.8 1.95 
Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 
 1.65 1.83 1.08 0.88 
Production Volume (Thousand Barrel of oil equivalent per day) 
Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 
 445 398 434 452 
Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 
 423.7 432 425 417 
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WOODSIDE 
Number in Workforce (employees and contractors) 
Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 
 2,133 2,150 2,025 1,996 
Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 
 2,019 2,000 2,100 3,650 
Year 2011    
 3,856    
Total Hours Worked (Workforce) 
Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 
 15,308,604 12,890,836 23,811,758 29,599,071 
Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 
 32,168,510 37,774,249 59,952,906 29,599,071 
Year 2011    
 29,258,318    
Lost Workday Incident  
Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 
 27 15 21 32 
Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 
 25 39 41 28 
Year 2011    
 20    
Total Recordable Incident 
Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 
 95 69 90 153 
Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 
 155 187 229 177 
Year 2011    
 140    
Lost Workday Frequency (LWF per million hours worked-workforce) 
Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 
 1.8 1.2 0.9 1.1 
Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 
 0.79 1.03 0.68 0.95 
Year 2011    
 0.68    
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Total Recordable Frequency(TRF per million hours worked-workforce) 
Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 
 6.2 5.4 3.8 5.1 
Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 
 4.82 4.95 3.82 5.98 
Year 2011    
 4.78    
Production Volume (Million Barrel of oil equivalent per year) 
Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 
 60.7 56.2 67.9 70.6 
Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 
 70.6 81.3 80.9 72.7 
Year 2011    
 64.6    
Drilling Depth (Meters) 
Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 
 93238 107197 89554 74198 
Year 2009 2010   
 54623 51908   
 
  
 90 
APPENDIX D 
CHEMICALS GROUP DATA AND CALCULATIONS 
DOW CHEMICAL 
Number of Employees 
Year 1995 1996 1997 1998 
 39,500 40,300 42,900 39,000 
Year 1999 2000 2001 2002 
 39,200 53,300 52,700 50,000 
Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 
 46,400 43,200 42,400 42,600 
Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 
 45,900 46,100 52,200 49,500 
Total Hours Worked (Million hours-employee) 
Year 1995 1996 1997 1998 
 79 80.6 85.8 78 
Year 1999 2000 2001 2002 
 78.4 106.6 105.4 100 
Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 
 92.8 86.4 84.8 85.2 
Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 
 91.8 92.2 104.4 99 
Injury and Illness Rate (IRR per 200,000 hours worked-employee) 
Year 1995 1996 1997 1998 
 2.22 1.71 1.74 1.4 
Year 1999 2000 2001 2002 
 1.24 1.08 0.86 0.74 
Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 
 0.6 0.51 0.52 0.48 
Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 
 0.38 0.4 0.29 0.32 
Loss of Primary Containment (LOPC-new portfolio per CCPS after 2005) 
Year 1995 1996 1997 1998 
 2405 2257 2217 2046 
Year 1999 2000 2001 2002 
 1798 1729 1533 1393 
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Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 
 997 791 1320 1105 
Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 
 920 768 461 355 
Process Safety Incident (PSI-new portfolio per CCPS after 2005) 
Year 1995 1996 1997 1998 
 143 138 137 110 
Year 1999 2000 2001 2002 
 84 74 81 77 
Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 
 65 52 90 58 
Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 
 69 74 44 45 
Annual Net Sales (Million dollar) 
Year 1995 1996 1997 1998 
 20,200 20,503 20,018 25,396 
Year 1999 2000 2001 2002 
 26,131 29,727 27,988 27,545 
Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 
 32,536 40,063 46,186 49,009 
Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 
 53,375 57,361 44,875 53,674 
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DOW CANADA 
Number of Employees  
Year 1994 1995 1996 1997 
 2,289 1,998 2,000 1,883 
Year 1998 2009 2000 2001 
 1,644 1,565 1,628 1,647 
Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 
 1,880 1,732 1,492 1,343 
Injury and Illness Rate (IRR per 200,000 hours worked-employee) 
Year 1994 1995 1996 1997 
 3.5 1.71 1.2 2.17 
Year 1998 2009 2000 2001 
 1.8 1.11 1.15 1.31 
Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 
 0.99 0.79 0.57 0.71 
Leak, Breaks and Spills 
Year 1994 1995 1996 1997 
 97 72 93 112 
Year 1998 2009 2000 2001 
 96 65 46 57 
Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 
 62 42 34 33 
Dow’s Process Safety Incident 
Year 1994 1995 1996 1997 
 N/A 1 2 5 
Year 1998 2009 2000 2001 
 3 4 2 1 
Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 
 3 0 3 3 
Production Volume (Million kilograms) 
Year 1994 1995 1996 1997 
 5851 7811 7592 6483 
Year 1998 2009 2000 2001 
 6525 7625 8485 9347 
Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 
 9797 9457 7945 8302 
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Direct Energy Usage (Trillion-joules) 
Year 1994 1995 1996 1997 
 31,594 333,53 32,567 31,961 
Year 1998 2009 2000 2001 
 30,602 33,169 33,770 45,520 
Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 
 42,029 39,435 32,653 33,291 
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DUPONT 
Number of Employees 
Year 1996 1997 1998 1999 
 97,000 98,000 101,000 94,000 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 
 93,000 79,000 79,000 81,000 
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 
 60,000 60,000 59,000 60,000 
Year 2008 2009 2010  
 60,000 58,000 60,000  
Total Hours Worked (Million hours-employee) 
Year 1996 1997 1998 1999 
 194 196 202 188 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 
 186 158 158 162 
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 
 120 120 118 120 
Year 2008 2009 2010  
 120 116 120  
Process Safety Incident per CCPS 
Year 1996 1997 1998 1999 
 155 140 103 80 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 
 93 30 14 8 
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 
 7 6 20 12 
Annual Net Sales (Million dollar) 
Year 1996 1997 1998 1999 
 23,644 24,088 24,767 26,918 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 
 28,268 24,726 24,006 26,996 
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 
 27,340 26,639 27,421 29,378 
Year 2008 2009 2010  
 30,529 26,109 31,505  
Annual Net Income (Million dollar) 
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Year 1996 1997 1998 1999 
 2991 3108 2913 219 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 
 2314 4328 1841 1002 
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 
 1780 2053 3148 2988 
Year 2008 2009 2010  
 2007 1755 3031  
 
EASTMAN 
Number of Employees 
Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 
 10,500 10,500 10,000 10,000 
Occupational Injury and Illness Rate (OII per 200,000 hours worked-employee) 
Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 
 0.8 0.75 0.6 0.79 
Day Away from Work Rate (DAFWR per 200,000 hours worked-employee) 
Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 
 0.08 0.16 0.11 0.11 
Process Safety Incident per CCPS 
Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 
 5 5 8 7 
Production Volume (Million kilograms) 
Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 
 4,994 4,823 4,714 4,809 
Net Earnings (Million dollar) 
Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 
 300 346 136 438 
Annual Net Sales (Million dollar) 
Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 
 5,513 5,936 4,396 5,482 
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FORMOSA 
Number of Employees 
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 
 2,133 2,150 2,025 1,996 
Year 2008 2009 2010  
 2,019 2,000 2,100  
Total Hours Worked (Thousand hours-employee) 
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 
 4,266 4,300 4,05 3,992 
Year 2008 2009 2010  
 4,038 4,000 4,200  
Lost Workday Incident Rate (LWIR per 200,000 hours worked-employee) 
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 
 0.37 0.86 0.58 0.42 
Year 2008 2009 2010  
 0.23 0 0.4  
Total Recordable Incident Rate (TRIR per 200,000 hours worked-employee) 
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 
 1.12 1.73 0.76 0.75 
Year 2008 2009 2010  
 0.78 0.43 0.79  
Process Safety Incident Rate (PSIR per 200,000 hours worked-employee) 
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 
 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.3 
Year 2008 2009 2010  
 0.03 0.03 0.03  
Process Safety Severity Rate (PSSR per 200,000 hours worked-employee) 
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 
 6.04 3.81 0.21 0.43 
Year 2008 2009 2010  
 0.08 0.08 0.06  
Production Volume ( Thousand Tons) 
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 
 4,600 4,400 4,600 4,750 
Year 2008 2009 2010  
 4,300 4,400 5,100  
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Energy Usage ( Billion-joules) 
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 
 31,280 30,800 29,900 28,975 
Year 2008 2009 2010  
 26,660 28,160 31,620  
 
HUNTSMAN 
Total Recordable Incident Rate (TRIR per 200,000 hours worked-employee) 
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 
 N/A 0.82 0.85 0.74 
Year 2008 2009   
 0.61 0.49   
Process Safety Incident Number 
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 
 31 30 48 42 
Year 2008 2009   
 36 17   
Energy Usage (Trillion-joules) 
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 
 150,000 140,000 120,000 70,000 
Year 2008 2009   
 56,000 50,000   
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APPENDIX E 
DRILLING CONTRACTOR GROUP DATA AND CALCULATIONS 
NOBLE CORPORATION 
Number in Workforce (Employees and contractors) 
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 
 5,300 5,567 6,336 6,600 
Year 2008 2009 2010  
 6,000 5,700 5,900  
Total Hours Worked 
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 
 11,008,012 11,833,656 12,696,413 13,426,878 
Year 2008 2009 2010  
 12,000,000 11,400,000 11,800,000  
Total Recordable Incident Rate (TRIR per 200,000 hours worked) 
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 
 0.74 1.17 0.77 0.89 
Year 2008 2009 2010  
 0.64 0.43 0.6  
Lost Time Incident Rate ( LTIR per 200,000 hours worked) 
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 
 0.11 0.25 0.03 0.12 
Year 2008 2009 2010  
 0.11 0.05 0.1  
Operating Days (Under contractual terms) 
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 
 16426 19603 19287 19395 
Year 2008 2009 2010  
 18904 17893 17700  
Total Drilling Depth Capacity (Feet) 
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 
 1,352,300 1,537,250 1,543,050 1,518,425 
Year 2008 2009 2010  
 1,496,900 1,383,650 1,597,950  
Recordable Case/ Operating Days (Per 100 days) 
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 
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 0.25 0.35 0.25 0.31 
Year 2008 2009 2010  
 0.20 0.14 0.20  
Recordable Case/ Drilling Depth Capacity (Per 10,000 feet) 
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 
 0.30 0.45 0.32 0.39 
Year 2008 2009 2010  
 0.26 0.18 0.22  
Lost-Time Case/ Operating Days (Per 100 days) 
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 
 0.037 0.076 0.010 0.041 
Year 2008 2009 2010  
 0.035 0.016 0.033  
Lost-Time Case/ Drilling Depth Capacity (Per 10,000 feet) 
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 
 0.045 0.096 0.012 0.053 
Year 2008 2009 2010  
 0.044 0.021 0.037  
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PARKER DRILLING 
Number in Workforce (Employees and contractors) 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 
 3,542 3,654 2,898 2,920 
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 
 3,014 3,040 2,628 3,087 
Year 2008 2009 2010  
 2,766 2,011 2,372  
Total Hours Worked (Thousand hours-workforce) 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 
 7,084 7,308 5,796 5,840 
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 
 6,028 6,080 5,256 6,174 
Year 2008 2009 2010  
 5,532 4,022 4,744  
Total Recordable Incident Rate (TRIR per 200,000 hours worked) 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 
 2.84 2.67 1.8 1.78 
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 
 1.06 0.97 0.86 0.81 
Year 2008 2009 2010  
 0.66 0.48 0.63  
Operating Days (Under contractual terms) 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 
 14235 16297 13267 8050 
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 
 11317 13692 10602 11915 
Year 2008 2009 2010  
 12716 9402 14527  
Total Drilling Depth Capacity (Feet) 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 
 755,265 838,455 694,205 491,750 
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 
 545,800 675,580 575,140 693,960 
Year 2008 2009 2010  
 683,890 466,430 498,280  
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Recordable Case/ Operating Days (Per 100 days) 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 
 0.71 0.60 0.39 0.65 
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 
 0.28 0.22 0.21 0.21 
Year 2008 2009 2010  
 0.14 0.10 0.10  
Recordable Case/ Drilling Depth Capacity (Per 10,000 feet) 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 
 1.33 1.16 0.75 1.06 
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 
 0.58 0.43 0.39 0.36 
Year 2008 2009 2010  
 0.27 0.21 0.30  
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